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COMMENT
WHAT A DIFFERENCE A
CONTRACT MAKES:
PROTECTING TAXPAYERS FROM
CHANGES IN THE TAX CODE
[C]ontractual arrangements, including those to which a sov-
ereign itself is a party, remain subject to subsequent legisla-
tion by the sovereign.'
Merely because the particular means by which the govern-
ment chose to breach its duties under the contract were based
on its powers to tax does not offer it a defense.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Tax legislation guarantees little.3 It is not a contract. Indeed, tax
benefits flow from legislative grace. Although the government does
not implicitly bind itself to taxpayers via legislation, could it do so
explicitly?4 Could the government offer tax breaks as an expressed or
implied benefit to a contract with a private party?
I Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986).
2 Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3 See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994); cf. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) ("Absent some clear indication that the legislature
intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that 'a law is not intended to create pri-
vate contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature
shall ordain otherwise .... .' Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and
repeal.") (quoting Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
4 There are several ways the government might do this. For instance, Professor Logue has
suggested that a taxpayer could form a contract with the IRS via a private letter ruling (although
its enforcement would be subject to the relevant tax legislation remaining the same). Kyle D.
Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precom-
mitment, 94 MicH. L. REV. 1129 (1996). This Comment will focus on currently existing models
of contract between the government and private citizens, where tax treatments are typically not
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This Comment draws inspiration from a recent case, Centex Cor-
poration v. United States, where the Federal Circuit upheld a sizeable
damage award for the government's breach of a contract with Centex,
an investment firm that agreed to help with the savings and loan
("S&L") bailout.5 The court held that the government promised to pay
Centex for some of the liabilities of the failing S&Ls and promised
Centex tax deductions notwithstanding this repayment. Usually, the
Tax Code does not allow deductions for compensated losses.6 But the
court held that taxpayers could "double-dip" in this narrow factual
context. The Federal Circuit agreed that Centex could obtain damages
when Congress passed legislation specifically eliminating this deduc-
tion after Centex agreed to buy the S&Ls.7
Centex presents at least two big questions that this Comment tries
to answer.
First, Centex succeeded on the theory of breach of the implied co-
venant of good faith and fair dealing.8 The trial court agreed that leg-
islation substantially aimed at undoing an inducement to the S&L
buyout contract violated this covenant. In other words, the tax treat-
ments Centex received were an implied benefit to their contract with
the government. But neither the trial court nor the Federal Circuit
mentioned the parade of cases denying that tax benefits standing
alone are guaranteed.9 This begs the question: could the government
guarantee tax benefits in a contract?
the only consideration offered by the government, though its rationale could apply to the private
letter ruling arrangements.
5 395 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court in United States v. Winstar Corp.,
518 U.S. 839, 844-58 (1996), provides a nice description of the U.S. "savings and loans"
(S&L's) system, summarized below.
Savings and loans are a "federally-conceived and assisted system to provide citizens with
affordable housing funds." Id. at 844 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-54 at 292 (1989)).
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, many S&Ls' portfolios were filled with long-term
fixed-rate mortgages executed when interest rates were low. A combination of high interest
rates and inflation then severely decreased the value of many S&Ls. Extensive deregulation
ensued. The government lowered the accounting and capital reserve requirements, causing
instability. However, because of the "realization" and "recognition" requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code (Tax Code), the S&Ls could not take advantage of the losses until they sold or
disposed of the loss assets. But, under the Tax Code as it existed in those days, the buyers of
these assets could not take advantage of the old losses either. The consequence: no one wanted
to buy the insolvent S&Ls. The government's response was to induce healthy organizations to
buy out the failing S&Ls.
6 See 26 U.S.C. § 165(a) (2006) (stating the general rule that there is a deduction for non-
compensated losses).
7 The piece of legislation was known as the Guarini Amendment. Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13224, 107 Stat. 312,485-86 (1993).
8 Centex Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 381 (2003); 2 ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 344 (2d ed. 2001).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994).
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Second, should private parties who take tax benefits as part of a
government contract do so at the peril of subsequent tax legislation?
Centex convinced the court that such an arrangement would give the
government an unfair advantage.
This Comment concludes that tax benefits may be the subject of or
inducements to government contracts. Furthermore, this Comment
concludes that even though enforcement of contractual rights depends
on government intervention, and tax legislation is a uniquely sover-
eign power, private contractors need not fear specific, targeted tax
legislation that takes away the benefits they have bargained for in
contracts with Uncle Sam.'0 They may obtain relief in damages from
the government.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congress's Retroactive Tax Powers
The tax laws motivate. If Congress passes a tax benefit, taxpayers
will take advantage. If the benefit gets rescinded later, be it retroac-
tively or prospectively," taxpayers will cry "detrimental reliance."
Such was the case in United States v. Carlton, the Supreme
Court's latest look at taxpayer reliance arguments.' 2 Congress had
authorized estates to deduct losses from certain sales of securities. 3
Mr. Carlton, the executor of an estate, accordingly purchased a large
block of stock with estate funds and resold the stock.' 4 A few years
later, Congress rescinded Mr. Carlton's benefit by making the law
retroactive.' 5 The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction.
Mr. Carlton appealed, conceding that the deduction he took was not
allowed, but arguing that the retroactive law violated the Due Process
Clause.
10 To a degree, one can accuse this Comment of propping up, and then knocking down a
"straw man" ("straw person," or "straw" if you like). However, the court's opinion in Centex
ignored the analysis presented in this Comment. So this Comment, working d la an appelate
court, sustains the result in Centex after analyzing it under Carlton.
I Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34 ("Moreover, the detrimental reliance principle is not limited
to retroactive legislation. An entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the relied-upon
expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be violative of
due process.").
12 Id.
13 The provision was enacted in 1986, and allowed a deduction of half of the proceeds of
"any sale of employer securities by the executor of an estate" to an employee stock ownership
plan. 26 U.S.C. § 2057(b) (1986).
14 The parties stipulated that Carlton bought the stock purely for tax reasons.
15 On December 22, 1987, Congress amended § 2057 to require that the stock to be sold
be "directly owned" by the decedent "immediately before death." As noted above, Mr. Carlton
purchased the shares of stock after the decedent passed away. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29.
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The Supreme Court sustained the Service's position-that it could
enforce Congress's retroactive tax legislation and that enforcement
did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court agreed with the
Service despite the fact that retroactive tax legislation feels intuitively
unfair. The Court has always been suspicious of reliance arguments
pitted against retroactive taxes, holding early in the history of indi-
vidual income taxation that:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a
liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of ap-
portioning the cost of government among those who in some
measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its
burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden,
its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due
process.
16
The Court reviews Due Process challenges to tax legislation for
whether the legislation is "unduly harsh and oppressive." This test is
akin to the "rational basis" test the Supreme Court uses for all eco-
nomic legislation. 17 The Carlton court applied this test and upheld the
Service's denial of the deduction. The Court held that the amendment
to the Tax Code that prevented Mr. Carlton's benefit was rationally
related to the legitimate goal of preventing transactions like the one in
which Mr. Carlton had engaged.18 The Court held that the amendment
was intended to clarify the Tax Code and to honor the original legisla-
tive purpose of the deduction. 19 The Court thought it significant that
the period of retroactivity was short and that Congress acted to correct
its error promptly.
20
Mr. Carlton had argued differently. He asserted that the Due Proc-
ess Clause protected his detrimental reliance on the unamended ver-
16 Id. at 33 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938)).
17 Id. at 30. But see id. at 39, 40-41 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that depriving a tax-
payer of some six hundred thousand dollars is probably harsh and oppressive under any stan-
dard, and chiding the majority for using an "exacting" standard borrowed from New Deal-era
review of economic legislation not in similar economic legislation cases, but instead in individ-
ual liberty cases, such as Roe v. Wade).
18 Id. at 31-32.
19 Id. at 32 ("congress, of course, might have chosen to make up the unanticipated reve-
nue loss through general prospective taxation, but that choice would have burdened equally
'innocent' taxpayers. Instead, it decided to prevent the loss by denying the deduction to those
who had made purely tax-motivated stock transfers. We cannot say that its decision was unrea-
sonable."). The deduction was designed to "create an 'incentive for stockholders to sell their
companies to their employees who helped them build the company rather than liquidate, sell to
outsiders, or have the corporation redeem their shares on behalf of existing shareholders."' Id. at
31 (citation omitted).
20 Id. at 33.
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sion of the statute. The Court disagreed. It expressed a willingness to
uphold Due Process Clause challenges to tax legislation only when
that legislation (retroactive or not) announced a "wholly new tax" and
held that tax benefits are not guarantees.21
The Court also held that preventing "significant and unanticipated
revenue loss" is a legitimate purpose, especially when the prevention
targets (rather than excuses) taxpayers like Mr. Carlton (who relied
on an old benefit), rather than forcing innocent taxpayers to foot the
bill.22 The Court expressed a willingness to protect detrimental reli-
ance only in extreme cases, that is, when the regulation that disap-
points the taxpayer cannot be rationally connected to a legitimate
legislative purpose.23
Like Mr. Carlton, the plaintiffs in Centex complained of upset reli-
ance interests. They bought the failing S&Ls thinking they could de-
duct the S&L's built-in losses despite getting assistance payments for
them. Puzzlingly, the Federal Circuit in Centex did not mention Carl-
24ton or similar cases. It instead ordered the government to pay com-
pensation for Centex's upset reliance interests.
The Centex court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's 1996 opi-
nion in United States v. Winstar,2 5 another S&L bailout case. The
court in Winstar held that the government cannot use regulation to
abrogate contractual promises of favorable tax treatment the govern-
ment makes that induce taxpayers to invest.26 The government let
acquiring institutions count the excess of the purchase price over the
failing S&Ls' assets as "supervisory goodwill." The acquirer could
count this as capital toward meeting federal capital reserve require-
ments. When later legislation forbade this treatment, Winstar and
several other acquiring institutions sued for contract damages. The
21 Id. at 34 (citing United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568 (1986)).
22 Id. at 32.
23 See id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the sta-
tute in this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. To pass consti-
tutional muster the retroactive and prospective aspects of the statute need only be 'rationally
related to a legitimate legislative purpose."') (citation omitted).
24 Nor did the court mention what was at one time the "politically dominant approach"-
that taxpayers relying on particular tax treatments should be protected from retroactive legisla-
tion by grandfather clauses and other forms of "transition relief." See Logue, supra note 4, at
1135 n.26 (citing Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 1575, 1650 (1979)).
25 518 U.S. 839 (1996). Justice Souter wrote for a plurality of himself, Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and O'Connor. Justice Breyer penned a separate concurring opinion, as did Justice
Scalia (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by
Justice Ginsberg.
26 Id. at 839.
27 For a good description of the case, see Daniel S. Goldberg, Government Precommit-
ment to Tax Incentive Subsidies: The Impact of United States v. Winstar Corp. on Retroactive
Tax Legislation, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1997), and Joshua L Schwartz, The Status of the
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court in Winstar discussed several unique facets of government con-
tracts, explored below.
In both Centex (which followed Winstar) and Carlton, the plaintiff
asked the Court to imply a promise of continuing tax benefits. In
Centex, but not in Carlton, the plaintiff received relief. Perhaps the
key distinguishing feature between Centex and Carlton is the
presence of the contract in Centex. Thus the first key question for
deciding cases like Centex is: does a government contract make a
material difference?
B. The Government as Contractor
The above question is normally a mundane one. Without a
contract, a private beneficiary can only enforce a noncontract promise
if (and to the extent that) the beneficiary can fit the promisor's
conduct within the special requirements of promissory estoppe128 or
unjust enrichment. 29 The beneficiary can compel the promisor to
continue or pay damages only if able to show the right type of express
promise or if able convince the court to imply one for restitution's
sake. Superimposing a contract on the dealings of two private parties
makes all the difference.
But the question becomes more intriguing when one swaps the
U.S. government for one of the private parties. When the government
is a party, Carlton and other cases foreclose "detrimental reliance"-
type arguments unless Due Process is violated.3 ° Indeed, legal
scholars have long noted that detrimental reliance arguments about a
Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report,
51 ALA. L. REV. 1177,1181 (2000).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (instructing that courts should
enforce promises that the promisor should know will induce action or forbearance by the pro-
misee, in justifiable reliance on the promise).
29 See id. § 4 cmt. b; Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("The quasi-contract, as we have said, is not really a contract, but a legal obligation closely akin
to a duty to make restitution .... Generally, in order to recover on a quasi-contractual claim, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant was unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's expense, and that
the circumstances were such that in good conscience the defendant should make restitution.").
30 See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government,
40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 216-17 n.71 (1987) (citing Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51,
60 (1984)). Cf. Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing
whether military recruiters formed an implied contract for medical benefits with soldiers, and
noting that "courts have consistently refused to give effect to government-fostered expectations
that, had they arisen in the private sector, might well have formed the basis for a contract or an
estoppel."). The courts have recognized an exception to the prohibition of estoppel only in
extreme cases. See Rabkin & Devins, supra, at 217 n.75 (citing cases holding that active mis-
leading by government officials and the complete absence of an effective remedy are at least
required).
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particular set of laws, particularly tax laws, are specious. 3' This is true
even though tax savings offered by Uncle Sam will entice the
taxpayer more than a comparable promise from his fellow citizen.
The only way a taxpayer can show that a tax treatment entitles him to
a continuing expectation of that treatment is to prove the existence of
a contract in some way protecting that promise.
The Constitution's text does not grant the government contracting
power.32 However, the Supreme Court implied contracting power
from the Constitution soon after the states ratified it.33 Today, courts
assume contracting authority even if the relevant statute is silent.
34
Courts apply traditional agency theory to the government's ability
to sign contracts.35 Government employees can bind the government
so long as they act within the scope of their authority.36 Where possi-
ble, courts treat the government like any private contractor.37 The
government is distinctly different in a few respects, which justifies
different treatment. But both parties can still claim the major defenses
from the common law.38
The U.S. government is different from a private contractor because
of both the ability of Congress to regulate and the constitutionally
mandated space between Congress in Article I and agencies in Article
II. Congress has the ability to direct the contracting power of agen-
cies. The agencies only have power to contract if and to the extent
Congress gives it to them.39 Thus, agencies contract subject to the
whims of Congress. Congressional legislation could conceivably nul-
lify obligations to which the contracting agency bound itself. Accord-
ingly, the concept of "impossibility of performance" (as a principle of
31 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509,
522 (1986) (citing sources).
32 1-3 JOHN COSGROVE MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:
LAW, ADMINISTRATION & PROCEDURE § 3.10 (Walter A.I. Wilson ed. 2006) (citing cases).
33 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet.
(30 U.S.) 131 (1831). The constitutional provisions most textually related to contract power are
Article IV's authorization of Congress to control the disposition of U.S. Government property
and Article I's authorization of Congress to pay the United States' debts and to provide for the
"general welfare." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, art. L §8, cl. 1.
3 United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 891 n.36 (citing 1 R. NASH & J. CIBINIC,
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW 5 (3d ed. 1977)). Usually, though, statutes grant the agency the
power to contract.
35 MCBRIDE & TOUHEY, supra note 32, § 17.20, at 2-17.
6 Id.
37 Id. § 1.20, at 1-1 (citing Cook v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875), for the "gen-
eral rule" that when the U.S. government "comes down from its position of sovereignty and
enters the domain of commerce, it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals
there.").
38 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 887.
39 See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 30, at 216.
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the common law) is key to any study of government contracting
power.
"Supervening government action" was one of the earliest examples
of impossibility sufficient to excuse performance, recognized in 1536
by the English courts n° The modern form of the doctrine has four
requirements: (1) performance must be actually "impracticable,"' (2)
nonoccurrence of the event was a basic assumption of the parties,42
(3) the party claiming responsibility must not be responsible for its
cause,4 3 and (4) the party claiming impossibility must not be held to a
greater obligation than provided for in the contract.4 How does this
doctrine change when one of the parties is the U.S. government?
Requirement (1) remains the same for private and government
contractors. As for requirement (2), the majority view is that govern-
ment nonintervention is a basic assumption of virtually all contracts.45
However, in Winstar, the Supreme Court effectively held that regula-
tory change in the tax area when the government is a party to the con-
tract usually does not excuse performance by either party because of
impossibility.
Justice Souter, writing for the plurality,46 noted that "the very fact
that such a contract [was] made [with the government] at all is at odds
with any assumption of regulatory stasis. 47 Of course, this finding in
Winstar was a factual one, and other cases will differ. But, under
Souter's logic, all cases in which the government promises tax
benefits will not permit the government to also mount an
impossibility defense.
40 Abbott of Westminster v. Clerke, 73 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1536) (excusing performance
on a contract to deliver wheat to a foreign country when delivery was made illegal by an act in
that country). Specifically, the Clerke court stated, "Supervening governmental action prevents
a party's performance by prohibiting it or imposing requirements that make it impossible, that
party is excused." Id. at 63.
41 See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 9.6 n.19 (noting that "impossibility means not only
strict impossibility but impracticability") (citation omitted).
42 Foreseeability (or not) is just one factor in this analysis. Id. § 9.6 n.51.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 28, § 261.
4 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 9.5 n.3-4 (citing cases); id. at § 9.6 (noting that the
new version of the impossibility doctrine is based on an estimation of whether courts should
depart from the usual rule that the promisor bears the risk of increased performance cost).
45 Id. § 262.
46 Courts attempting to construe Winstar typically follow the plurality opinion's reason-
ing, noting either that most other courts have done the same or that the plurality's opinion is
"narrower" in scope than the concurring and dissenting opinions. See, e.g., Franklin Fed. Sav.
Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the plurality's take
was the narrower (i.e., more exacting) view because the plurality treated the unmistakability
doctrine as a rule of law and required a clear statement shifting risk onto the government, and
Justice Scalia's concurrence did not).
47 United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 905--06 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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As for requirement (3), if Congress passed a law preventing per-
formance, the government could no longer claim impossibility under
the test for impossibility announced above. 48 Courts, however, ana-
lyze these potentially disqualifying acts differently. 49 Courts instead
take account of the government's dual roles as public sovereign and
"private-ish" contractor. The Court in Winstar discussed these com-
peting roles at some length. Here is an attempt to synthesize its views.
Courts sometimes must account for the U.S. government's sover-
eign duty to look after the general welfare.50 This duty to the public is
more important than contractual obligations to individual parties. So,
courts treat the government as having a split personality.5t If the gov-
ernment acts "as a contractor" and breaks its deal, its contract partner
can sue it for breach.52 However, if the government acts "as a sover-
48 This assumes that the actions of one branch of the government (e.g., Congress) can be
attributed to the other branches (e.g., executive agencies). Ignoring any comparisons from
agency law, sometimes treating the government as a unitary whole may not make total sense.
For instance, in the Centex case, the agency lobbied Congress not to abrogate the tax benefits
the agency could extend to acquirers of the failing S&Ls. In fact, it is probably safe to assume
that any time an agency other than the one that signed the contract undoes the contract by regu-
lation, the agency that signed the contract will be upset. Furthermore, one could argue that
treating the branches separately is a good thing. After all, separation of powers is a cornerstone
principle in constitutional law. In this way, Congress's ability to pass targeted regulations is a
check on an agency's temptation to sign contracts not in the public interest. However, courts
have not treated the government this way. Plaintiffs must sue the United States, and the money
does not come from the budget of the agency that signed the contract.
49 There are many other examples of ways courts treat the government differently from
private parties. For instance, courts treat the government differently than private parties by
allowing private parties to rely on government representations if the government has superior
knowledge when the private party could not have found out differently through reasonable
diligence. See MCBRIDE & TOuHEY, supra note 32, § 13.100, at 2-13. This rule is particularly
important in construction contracts. The differences all turn on the government's dual role as
sovereign and contractor.
Also, the sovereign acts doctrine works conceptually as an "excuse from impossibility."
Usually, when a party causes the impossibility of its own performance, he cannot use it to ex-
cuse his performance (as the definition outlined above suggests).
50 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The following discussion centers on two government
defenses-the sovereign acts defense and the unmistakability defense. I discuss the sovereign
acts defense and unmistakability defense with some trepidation--the issue sharply divided the
Supreme Court into four separate opinions in Winstar. Although Justice Souter's plurality
opinion (generally held to be the majority opinion) contends that the defenses are designed to
put the government into the same position that a private party would enjoy, see Winstar, 518
U.S. at 896 ("The sovereign acts doctrine thus balances the Government's need for freedom to
legislate with its obligation to honor its contracts by asking whether the sovereign act is properly
attributable to the Government as contractor. If the answer is no, the Government's defense to
liability depends on the answer to the further question, whether that act would otherwise release
the Government from liability under ordinary principles of contract law."), the sovereign acts
doctrine is still unique to the government.
51 See, e.g., Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) ("The two characters
which the government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor can
the United States while sued in the one character be made liable in damages for their acts done
in the other.").
52 Thus, any actions by the agency responsible for the contract that prevent its own per-
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eign" (pursuant to its duty to look after the general welfare) and
breaks its deal, its contract partner cannot sue.53 In this circumstance,
the government's defense is known as the "sovereign acts" defense.
Courts have distinguished between these two roles by looking at the
scope of the government's alleged deal-breaking action.
Regulation54 "designed merely to eliminate an obligation that arose
under one of the Government's contractual relationships,"'55 "legisla-
tion targeting a class of contracts to which [the government] is a par-
ty,"' 56 or regulation that had the "substantial effect" of erecting legal
barriers to the government's performance57 falls into the "govern-
ment-as-contractor" category.58 Courts speak of these regulations as
"targeted acts." 59 If the government fails to perform due to a targeted
act, contractors can sue for breach.
On the other hand, acts "as a sovereign" do not make the govern-
ment liable.60 These are the "multifarious sovereign acts, needful for
the public good [that] incidentally disable [the government] or the
other party from performing one of the promised acts., 61 The gov-
ernment cannot agree with its contract partners to not exercise sover-
eign power.62 Promises not to exercise a sovereign power get treated
formance usually entitle private contractors to damages. See MCBRIDE & TOUHEY, supra
note 32, at 1-1. There will, of course, be difficulties at the margins about what constitutes the
"contracting agency itself."
53 See Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Deming v.
United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190, 191 (1865) ("The United States as a contractor are not responsible
for the United States as a lawgiver.").
5 Typically (but not exclusively) this is a piece of congressional legislation; acts by the
other branches of government are likewise subject to the contractor-or-sovereign analysis. See
Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 460 (citing Jones v. United States, I Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)).
55 Centex, 395 F.3d at 1308 (quoting the trial court's opinion).
56 Id. at 1307 (quoting United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 898 n.45 (1996)).
57 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 899 (describing an act as not "public and general" (and therefore
not "sovereign") if it has the "substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractual
obligations").
58 Justice Scalia's opinion (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) expressed the view
that the sovereign acts doctrine is merely an echo of the unmistakability doctrine-both express
a presumption that the government did not assume the risk of a change in its laws. Id. at 918-22
(Scalia, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion (joined by Justice Ginsburg) held that
the sovereign acts doctrine requires a strict separation between the two roles of government and
held that courts must pigeon-hole every government act into either "sovereign" or "contractor"
categories.
59 Centex, 395 F.3d at 1305.
60 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 891 (quoting Horowitz, 267 U.S. at 461) ("Whatever acts the gov-
ernment may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot
be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it
enters with private persons.").
61 Id. at 921 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 881.
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as promises to pay damages if the government does exercise that sov-
ereign power.
63
But courts will not enforce the government's promise to exercise
or not exercise a sovereign power or pay damages unless the promise
is "unmistakably clear" from the contract.64 This "unmistakability
defense" is another way that the government is treated differently
from a private party. The Winstar Court divided on whether to treat
the requirement of unmistakability as a substantive requirement, or
whether it was just a rule of construing government contracts. The
plurality held that the government must make it clear that it is surren-
dering any sovereign power. The more "sovereign-ish" the power that
the government surrenders, then the more likely it is that the unmis-
takability doctrine will apply. For example, the plurality said that in
"humdrum supply contracts," it would not impose an unmistakability
requirement on the government because of the practical difficulties it
would pose.65
The other Justices in Winstar thought that unmistakability is
simply a rule of construction. Justice Breyer, in his concurring
opinion, opined that courts should simply be more deferential in
construing government agreements when the exercise of a sovereign
66power might be at issue. Justice Scalia espoused the view that the
unmistakability doctrine functions as a presumption. He said
unmistakability means courts should presume that governments do
not intend to surrender sovereign powers.67 Neither the Supreme
Court nor the lower courts have taken any real steps to clear up the
confusion in the years since the Winstar decision in 1996, and the
Federal Circuit has begun the thankless task of applying Winstar and
its reasoning to other cases.
68
As the preceding discussion indicates, courts struggle with how to
deal with the government as a contractor. The courts in Centex and
Winstar paid lip-service to the government's argument that tax
regulation is always a sovereign act. But both courts held that the
63 Id. (citing Amino Bros. Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
64 See id. (opinions of Souter, Stevens, Breyer, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ., and Rehn-
quist, C.J.). But see id. at 910-18 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that the unmistakability
doctrine was not intended to replace usual rules of contract construction and that a special policy
reason must apply to justify deploying unmistakability); id. at 871-72 ("[S]overeign power...
governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless sur-
rendered in unmistakable terms.").
65 Id. at 880.
66 Id. at 910-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 919-22 (Scalia, J., concurring). The parties are free to put on evidence to the
contrary.
6 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1181 (citing Cienaga Gardens v. United States, 162 F.3d
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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regulation that removed promised benefits was not sovereign. It was
targeted. Therefore, the government had to pay damages. The next
section of this Comment attempts to apply and elaborate on the
principles discussed above.
III. ANALYSIS
The question for analysis, then, is: what are (and what should be)
the relevant differences between Jerry Carlton and Centex Corpora-
tion? Carlton dictates the opposite result in Centex if tax regulation is
always a sovereign act. Carlton, by holding that taxpayers rely on tax
treatments at their peril, says that it is. In both cases, the government
was trying to induce a particular behavior from the taxpayer. Two
things must be true for Carlton to be distinguishable from Centex: the
government must be able to promise tax benefits as an inducement to
a contract, and there must be something about the government-private
contractual relationship that entitles the government's contract partner
to the relief denied to regular taxpayers.
Part A will discuss whether Congress should be able to promise
tax benefits to taxpayers and whether tax legislation can ever be any-
thing but a sovereign act. It will conclude that tax treatments are a
proper subject of government promises, and that, under the right cir-
cumstances, courts (like the Federal Circuit in Centex) can conclude
that tax legislation may be "targeted" rather than "sovereign," and
thus entitle the private contractor to damages.
Assuming tax benefits are a proper subject of a promise, Part B
will discuss whether private contractors should be entitled to dam-
ages. It will then consider whether the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing-the key difference between Carlton and Centex-
should be deployed to protect government contractors in a way that
private contractors are not protected.
Part C will briefly review other proffered explanations for the re-
sult and analysis in Centex.
A. What Is So Special About Tax Promises?
There are limits to what the government can promise as considera-
tion to private contractors. For instance, the President (and his agen-
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cies) cannot offer funding to private parties, 69 nor can agencies bind
Congress to pass or not pass legislation.7°
Recall that the government induced Centex to buyout various
S&Ls by offering Centex the prospect of taking account of the ac-
quired S&Ls' losses even after receiving assistance payments that
recouped them.7' As in Centex, tax benefits will usually be induce-
ments, rather than consideration (to the extent it makes a difference).
If the only consideration the government gives is a legislative scheme,
instead of signing a contract, the taxpayer can just take advantage of
the legislative scheme, though the legislation will be no guarantee.
72
Even though agencies cannot bind Congress to legislate or to not
legislate, courts have always had a special way of dealing with con-
tractual promises to do something out of the control of the promisor.
Promises that an uncontrollable condition will get fulfilled are treated
as pledges of indemnification.73 Thus, explicit promises to legislate
(or not) are construed as promises to indemnify if the promise gets
broken and Congress legislates. Carlton holds that tax regulation it-
self is not a promise, but could the government be held to a promise if
it used tax regulation to induce a taxpayer to contract with it or of-
fered tax benefits as consideration?
On a theoretical level, the government can first argue that it should
not be bound to the contracts it makes. Contracts are only worth the
paper they are written on if and to the extent that the government
(specifically the judicial branch) will enforce them. This argument
has been used by commentators as a justification for refusal to en-
force onerous terms for violating "public policy. ' '74 This Comment
will not discuss the role of contractual enforcement by the judiciary to
effectuate social and economic policy. But suffice it to say that it
69 See Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1287-88 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
President lacks the authority to guarantee lifetime medical care to combat veterans because
doing so would violate the separation of powers doctrine by giving the president the power of
the purse, which is given exclusively to Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution).
70 United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 881-82 (1996) (citing Amino Bros. Co. v.
United States, 372 F.2d 485, 491 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
71 Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Thus, we hold
that as of late 1988 acquiring institutions had the legal right to deduct the built-in losses of
acquired thrifts in FSLIC-assisted transactions, even if those losses were offset by assistance
payments from FSLIC.").
72 This Comment will not discuss this possibility at any great length. See supra note 4.
73 One such promise would be: "I promise the Browns will win the Super Bowl." See
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion) ("Holmes's example is famous: 'in the case of a
binding promise that it shall rain tomorrow, the immediate legal effect of what the promisor
does is, that he takes the risk of the event, within certain defined limits, as between himself and
the promisee."').
74 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 720 (1990).
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would be a strange day if the government were able to use illusory
contracts and the power to procure its own impossibility to regulate.
For many of the same reasons discussed below, no matter what policy
objective would be furthered by using illusory contracts and sucker-
ing unwitting taxpayers, the damage from the concomitant policy
message of untrustworthiness would far exceed the benefits.
A second way of asking whether the government can or should be
bound to the contracts it makes deals with tax legislation specifically.
Moreover, another way of phrasing the question of whether courts
should be willing to imply promises not to change tax treatment is
whether an act of tax legislation can ever be a "specific, targeted
regulation" that would make the government liable for breaching an
existing contractual obligation. If tax regulations are always sovereign
acts, then promises of tax benefits could be undone at the stroke of a
legislative pen, and courts would never be able to imply promises to
continue present tax treatments. An agency could induce a contractor
into an agreement via certain tax treatments. The government could
then undo the benefits with regulation. Because the removal would be
"sovereign," courts would excuse the government's non-performance.
The contractors would be left to bear their increased costs.
In addressing the implied promise argument, courts should be
skeptical about whether any legislation can ever be "targeted." The
legislative process ensures that targeted legislation will almost cer-
tainly fail.75 Every bill must pass through a gauntlet of competing
interests. The result: bills are almost uniformly broadly worded and
broadly conceptualized to appease the many concerned parties. How-
ever, public policy solutions come most quickly where the public
perceives injustice and where a targeted fix is easy.76 Tax benefits
received "unjustly" form an easy rallying point for political opposi-
tion. For such tax treatments, all Congress needs to do is abrogate the
provisions providing for it. Public policy moves in such small
changes, and so it is clear that some legislation will be, as an empiri-
cal matter, "targeted. 77
75 See CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT, GOVERNING HEALTH: THE'
POLITICS OF HEALTH POLICY 305-07 (3d ed. 2006) ("Things are left deliberately vague so that
many people with different perspectives can see their views represented in the same ambiguity.
More detail might lose a vote.").
76 See generally JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(2d ed. 1995) (describing the public policymaking process as one that moves only when a pre-
cipitating event opens a "policy window," when the solution will not impose costs that are "too
high," and the political climate facilitates the solution).
'n See WEISSERT & WEISSERT, supra note 75, at 314-15 (citing several studies noting that
public policy moves most readily in "small bites," and arguably only in small bites).
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But the position that no legislation is targeted proves too much.
Most political scientists would agree that all public policy (targeted or
not) requires evidence of a problem to give the issue salience. Under
this theory, all legislation would be targeted if the contractual benefit
was a problem and the legislation in some way fixed it.
Even if one accepts that some legislation can be targeted, tax legis-
lation is the least likely suspect. The power to tax and raise revenue is
the quintessential public act. The tax power received protection under
the "reserved powers" doctrine in very early case law on the subject.78
Indeed, as one commentator has noted:
Tax legislation, however, is the sovereign power most likely
to be viewed as a reserved power of the sovereign and there-
fore subject to future change. Establishing that the risk and
burden of future change has been assumed by the government
likely will prove to be no easy task.79
Also, the Winstar plurality cited several examples of cases where
powers far more trivial than revenue-raising were held to be perform-
ance-excusing "sovereign powers." This included a case in which the
ability to grant navigational easements in a tributary of the Arkansas
River was held a sovereign power.80 The Court also reaffirmed the
self-evident proposition that the tax power is sovereign. In Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe,81 the Supreme Court held that even the taxing
authority of Native American tribes was a sovereign act.
82
The apparently bright line drawn thus far dims when one asks:
should the government be allowed to use tax regulation as a ruse to
breach deals that were legal when the government made them? The
answer plainly is "no." The sovereign acts defense was not intended
to give the government an excuse to be nasty.83 The plurality opinion
78 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 18 n.45 (citing Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly,
66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446 (1862)). The reserved powers doctrine holds that a state may not
contract away essential aspects of its sovereignty. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817
(1880) (holding that a state cannot contract away its police power).
79 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 24.
90 United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 878 (1996) (citing United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 706 (1987)).
81 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).
82 The Winstar plurality lamely distinguished these cases as instances where the plaintiffs
sought an injunction instead of damages. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881.
83 Strangely, where the justices came out in Winstar turned basically on what they thought
of a famous aphorism by Justice Holmes: "[M]en must turn square corners when they deal with
the government." Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
Accepting this as a proposition of law, the phrase refers only to the contractor's compliance
with the explicit terms of the deal. For example, the plaintiffs in Winstar and Centex indeed
"turned square comers" (the Government did not counterclaim for breach in either case), but
they were still deprived of the benefit of their bargain.
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in Winstar held that the purpose of the sovereign acts doctrine was to
put the government in the same position it would occupy as a private
party. 84 The doctrine is not designed to give the government a special
power to repudiate its deals.
The sovereign acts doctrine instead was simply designed as recog-
nition that the government's powers in contracting and regulating
should be thought of as separate and that every action by the govern-
ment should be categorized into its appropriate part. In the parlance
of impossibility, recall that a party can not claim impossibility as an
excuse if its own acts caused the impossibility.86 The sovereign acts
doctrine is just designed to recognize that acts that are sufficiently
public and general prevent private parties who contract with the gov-
ernment from claiming impossibility. The sovereign acts doctrine also
honors the principle that generality in legislation can sometimes be a
good thing-generality can indicate that the statute at issue has not
been passed to try to burden the few over the many.
87
None of these principles would be honored by a court refusing to
find an implied promise of a tax treatment simply because the treat-
ment is a tax regulation. Congress must be free to pass tax legislation
when it pleases. But when it crosses the line into the realm of substan-
tially eliminating governmental contractual obligations, then courts
should be willing to enforce implied promises not to change the law.
Acts that specifically abrogate contractual duties should not excuse
performance, and the government bears the risk of these acts.88
Although the political process militates toward generality, courts
should not be fearful of the unique nature of tax legislation. Tax bene-
fits should be treated no differently from any other consideration the
government can offer. Although Carlton provides that tax regulation
itself is not a promise, courts should be willing to imply a promise of
8 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 892 ("[T]he key to [the sovereign acts doctrine's] proper scope
is... to put the Government in the same position that it would have enjoyed as a private
contractor....").
85 See id. at 895.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 28, § 261; 2 FARNSWORTH, supra
note 8, § 9.6 at 551.
97 Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 896. The opposite, however, can sometimes be true, and gener-
ality in legislation can be a window to abuse. Those enforcing general statutes have wide and
potentially discriminatory discretion. Courts may strike down overly general statutes if they are
too vague, but those dangers are not really implicated here. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 61-62 (1998) (holding Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance unconstitutionally
vague because, in part, it gave police officers too much discretion to enforce the statute).
88 See, e.g., Sunswick Corp. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 221 (1948) (holding that the
government had to pay plaintiff construction companies' increased costs when the U.S. wage
boards ordered a wage increase).
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tax treatments and the appropriate measure of damages from breaking
it.
B. What Is So Special About Government Contracts?
Based on the analysis of the previous section, although tax legisla-
tion bears the hallmarks of a sovereign act, if it is directed at relieving
the government of its contractual obligations, courts should be willing
to imply a promise of those benefits. But why should the presence of
a contract make this an acceptable result?
After all, the rationale for not granting taxpayers like Jerry Carlton
relief makes sense.89 Private investors face risks when they invest
money. Changes in tax laws are one of them. Requiring the
government (instead of the investor) to bear the costs of these risks is
inefficient (for the same reasons all other types of insurance are
inefficient-they insulate the consumer from the costs of their
actions).90 Usually, the government does not promise to insure against
them. Furthermore, legislation, even tax legislation, is "simply not a
contract"9' in a formal sense.
Why, then, should courts be willing to imply a term guaranteeing
benefits? Why create the opposite result for taxpayers just because
they have signed a contract with the government?
One potential reason for implying such a term would be to com-
pensate for unequal bargaining power. Courts are always sensitive to
inequality in bargaining power between contracting parties.92 The
court's vigilance over unconscionable terms of the contract is propor-
tional to the inequality of bargaining power. No entity has more bar-
gaining power than the U.S. government. Private contracts typically
exist at the mercy of the governing law in the jurisdiction where the
contract is consummated. Obviously, the ability to influence those
laws benefits private parties. Things are a step worse when the con-
tractor is the lawmaker itself.
Under any definition of "bargaining power," the government has
more of it than even the largest commercial entities. 93 The govern-
89 See Logue, supra note 4, at 1135-37 (citing Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The
Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 65-66 (1977), and Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 513-14, 520,
527-36 (1986)) (summarizing the work of Professors Graetz and Kaplow).
9 Id.
91 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14-15.
92 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.28 (citing cases).
93 See Gene Ming Lee, Note, A Case for Fairness in Public Works Contracting, 65 FORD.
L. REV. 1075, 1097 (1996) (citing the example of construction contracts, and noting that the
government is loath to allow a variance from the material terms of the contract because it might
open the door to challenges by competing bidders for the contract).
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ment includes terms in its contracts covering risk allocation (includ-
ing the risk of subsequent changes in the law) and methods of dispute
resolution.
94
However, courts have not been receptive to theories based on un-
conscionability/unequal bargaining power in government contracts.
While the government is treated like a private party when possible,
and undoubtedly has all the leverage of the Federal Reserve, courts
have held that those private parties who seek government contracts
are also more sophisticated, offsetting the government's advantage.
Similarly, courts like Centex that want to imply a promise to pay
damages face a difficult challenge from Carlton at the level of policy.
The Supreme Court in Carlton held that taxpayers who relied on a tax
benefit must help repay the costs of the tax benefits that get undone
by later regulations. But, if taxpayers have signed a deal with the
government, the government must now cover the repayment.95 The
private taxpayers that went further in the "wrong direction" (as
evinced by later regulation that undoes the prior tax benefit) by sign-
ing a contract are given more leeway than those who merely relied on
the statute.
The key distinction, and the one that stands the best chance of veri-
fying the Centex result, is that Congress did make a pledge in Centex
not made in Carlton. The line of cases leading up to Carlton stands
for the idea that courts recognize Congress's almost limitless power
to impose retroactive taxation.96 However, those same cases indicate
that courts will hold the government accountable for regulation that
disappoints particularly weighty reliance interests.
97
When a taxpayer executes a contract with the government after be-
ing induced by a particular tax result, the taxpayer exhibits one of the
weightier forms of reliance found in the law, by actually signing a
contract and agreeing to be bound to a performance of their own in
exchange for tax benefits. As referred to earlier, because the contract-
signer (Centex) went further in the "wrong direction" compared to the
94 See id. (noting that agencies prefer to allocate all the risks in a contract with the gov-
ernment upon the private contracting party). For example, in run-of-the-mill construction and
procurement contracts, the government awards the contract to the lowest bidder. It has the effect
of reducing negotiations to one term: price. The other terms are effectively non-negotiable.
Granted, the dangers in contracts promising tax benefits may not be as bad as construction
contracts.
95 Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that it is a constitu-
tional mandate that the government not impose burdens on individual taxpayers that in fairness
should be borne by all taxpayers).
96 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 10 (citing Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxa-
tion, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 265, 270 (1993)).
97 Id. at 31 (citing Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 694-95 (1960)).
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normal taxpayer (Jerry Carlton), the contract-signer has a much
stronger reliance interest. As such, courts should act to reasonably
protect the taxpayer/contractor's reliance interests.
The existence of a contract also binds the government, as a whole,
to the implicit terms courts will read into all contracts. The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one of those implied terms.
The government is bound, like other parties, to the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 98 Key to the argument against relieving
the Carltons of the world is that the government does not usually
promise to insure against market risks like changes in tax law. When
the government does, the policies supporting contractual enforcement
apply. And whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing should be deployed to protect a party from tax regulations in-
volves a question of policy.99 Looking to the doctrine's history and
purpose answers that policy question.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing functions as an
implicit term in every contract. Judge Easterbrook has described it as
"a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportun-
istic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the
time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by
the parties." 1 It is not a requirement that one party extend a helping
hand to the other. 10 1 Courts will apply it to the government102 and
other parties that have substantial bargaining power.10 3 Justice Car-
dozo's opinion in a celebrated early case describing the doctrine held
that "we are not to suppose that one party was to be placed at the
mercy of the other."'1 4
Granting the government the power to renege on its deals via regu-
lation would do just that. There are many policies behind holding the
98 Rumsfeld v. Freedom N.Y., Inc., 329 F.3d 1320, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
99 See Aron E. Goldschneider, Cheater's Proof: Excessive Judicial Deference Toward
Educational Testing Agencies May Leave Accused Examinees No Remedy to Clear Their
Names, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 97, 125-26 (citing Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss,
Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has
Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585 (1996)).
The courts have described the doctrine as a very nebulous one, and highly dependent on the
facts of the case.
l0Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(1990). A basic assumption of contracting parties is that both parties will honor the contract.
This is evident from the very existence of the contract.
10 1 Id. at 1358 (holding that the district judge erred in holding that a bank's decision not to
extend additional credit to the shoe company until it filed for bankruptcy was "inequitable").
i 02 See Rumsfeld, 329 F.3d at 1330.103 See Anthony's Pier Four v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1991).
104 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91 (1917) (citing Hearn v. Stevens,
111 A.D. 101, 106 (1906)); Russell v. Allerton, 115 N.E. 391 (111. 1888) (holding that the plain-
tiff shipper of cattle could not arbitrarily disapprove of the ventilation defendant steamer agreed
to provide).
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government to its bargains. First, the government should strive to be
legitimate in the eyes of its constituents. Private parties face only the
threat of negative consumer reaction and loss of market share if they
are unreliable contracting partners. But the government faces poten-
tial political reprisal and (in tax legislation) increased administrative
costs to enforce the Tax Code.'15 The government likewise has an
interest in being a reliable contracting partner because it depends
upon the work of private contracting partners to carry out many of its
day-to-day activities. Predictability has a value. If the government is
seen as unreliable, it will have to pay higher prices (essentially "re-
nege insurance").10 6 Courts have long recognized this; even during the
greatest economic crisis in the country's history (the Great Depres-
sion), the Supreme Court required the government to fulfill its con-
tractual obligations to debtors. 10 7
The policies behind requiring the government to honor its contrac-
tual obligations are inversely proportional to the policies behind the
sovereign acts defense: the more targeted a piece of legislation, the
more acute becomes the harm from violating the policies behind re-
quiring the government to be bound by its own contracts. The more
committed the taxpayer was from the outset (contract (Centex) vs.
conduct-in-reliance (Carlton)), the greater his reliance interest, and
the more the subsequent removal destroys the benefit of his bargain.
Thus, courts should be more willing to force the government to bear
the risk of the contractor's increased costs resulting from change in
the tax laws. And the more general the tax legislation, the more likely
it is motivated by a legitimate desire to raise revenue.
Furthermore, regulation removing prior tax benefits in violation of
a contract is a double whammy. The government thus commits two
inefficiencies: reneging on a tax benefit and breaking the sanctity of
contracts.10 8 To be sure, sometimes breaching an agreement is the
more efficient choice. 1°9 But as a general rule, reliability (and the
specter of damages for unreliability) increases efficiency. These poli-
105 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 7 ("Enforcement of a tax system that is viewed as un-
fair will require a good deal of coercive governmental power, which will increase administrative
costs.").
'06 This figure is known as the "risk premium." See id. at 6.
l07See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,580 (1934).
108 See Goldberg, supra note 27, at 6 ("Creating uncertainty in the amount of the subsidy,
such as by making a periodic subsidy uncertain in duration and subject to removal by legislative
whim, is economically inefficient because it requires the government to compensate prospective
recipients of the subsidy by including a risk premium in the subsidy.").
109See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1133-34 (11th Cir. 2004) (not-
ing that efficient breaches are encouraged).
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cies have been apparent since the founding of the U.S. As Alexander
Hamilton said, when speaking on the public debt of the United States:
[T]he established rules of morality and justice are applicable
to nations as well as to individuals; that the former as well as
the latter are bound to keep their promises; to fulfill their en-
gagements with respect to the rights of property which others
have acquired under contracts with them. Without this there
is an end of all distinct ideas of right or wrong, justice or in-
justice, in relation to society or government. There can be no
such thing as rights, no such thing as property or liberty; all
the boasted advantages of a constitution of government van-
ish into air. l lO
Because tax legislation is not a promise, the government is under
no obligation (save what remains of the "harsh and oppressive"
standard) to be fair to individual taxpayers.1 ' If we can agree that the
government should be treated like a private party whenever possible,
then (for the same reasons) it should be treated like a private party by
not being allowed to explicitly prevent performance of its own deal.
So, when targeted regulation succeeds, the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing should extend to prohibit legislation
withdrawing tax benefits promised by the government. This is not a
consequence of the tax laws or of constitutional constraints on them.
Rather, it flows from the idea that the government should not get to
be a dishonest contractor. Regulations that specifically abrogate
contracts, like those at issue in the Centex contract, should give
private taxpayers/contractees a right to damages.
The relationship among Carlton, Centex, and the sovereign acts
doctrine can be summarized thus:
1103 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 13-14 (Henry Ca-
bot Lodge ed. 1904), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Hamilton_0249.03.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2007).
111 See supra Section II.A.
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Full scope of regulatory action
Likelihood of excuse
Full scope of regulatory action
Likelihood of excuse
C. Epilogue: Was Something Else Going on in Centex?
Carlton says things about the importance of tax legislation that
cannot be ignored in deciding whether an instance of tax legislation is
a targeted act, regardless of a contract's presence. What might explain
Centex' s reticence?
Comparatively "
smaller scope
of protectio____n
When No Contract
_Exists
Protection All other regulation
only iflaw is
harsh and
oppressive
When a Contract
Exists
Targeted Sovereign
regulation regulation
Implied
covenant of
good faith and
fair dealing
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For one, some commentators have argued that Carlton-type cases
in the future should be decided under a Centex/Winstar rationale.
They have noted that government tax subsidies will only work well if
they can be guaranteed.' 12 This is because if a taxpayer "gets burned,"
the government will have to offer more to get the taxpayer to invest in
the future.113 They argue that the government should protect the ex-
pectations of taxpayers, contract or not.
Other commentators, however, have explained any "disengage-
ment" by the Centex court as resulting from a broad interpretation of
Winstar:
[I]n [S&L cases], the Court of Federal Claims has . . .
adopted a position that the basic questions of liability were
settled by the Supreme Court in Winstar and that what re-
mains to be done primarily is to calculate damages and sec-
ondarily to address some collateral issues as to which parties
are entitled to receive them.' 
14
Thus, what one may see in Centex is not the result of careful exegesis
of existing precedent at the confluence of tax and constitutional law.
Instead, it is a court finding repose in an interpretation from the
nation's highest court. The Centex court embraced the jurisprudential
respite that Winstar provided in a highly similar factual context.
Using Winstar as a shortcut is understandable because of the high
number of S&Ls cases, the amount of money involved, and the
complexity of the deals at issue. Indeed, S&L litigation is something
of a growth industry. As of July 31, 2000, $1.158 billion has been
handed out in settlements or court judgments in "goodwill" (Winstar-
type) cases alone.1 15
Future courts, however, should be careful to consider the special
role of tax legislation and its role atop the list of historically sovereign
powers. Tax laws are especially likely to sweep broadly and are more
likely than other regulations to address important questions of
national fiscal policy. In some cases, the challenged tax regulation
will appear to address such an important question. But it may relieve
the government of its obligation to perform under some of its
contracts. The reliance of taxpayers on government tax treatments
may have been the very problem that gave rise to the regulation.
112 See, e.g., Logue, supra note 4.
131d. at 1139.
14 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1181.
11 Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 31, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/banking/2000dec/brvl 3n2_2.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007).
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Because tax treatments that are seen as unfair may have been the
genesis of the regulation, courts are left to decide which is more
important: correcting "erroneous" tax treatments or protecting the
sanctity of government contracts. To make this choice, courts should
consider the competing policies outlined above and decide where the
challenged regulation lies: excusable problem-solving by the
government or reactionary relief, entitling the contractors to damages
from an implied promise not to change the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress can usually change its mind and impose retroactive taxes
on the general populus without fearing reprisal. Sometimes, it
promises tax benefits to private parties. There is something special
about tax legislation, which might seem to suggest that the
government should be able to remove promised tax benefits in all
circumstances. This argument, however, cuts both ways. Tax
legislation is also special in its ability to induce particular behaviors.
Taxpayers may find tax benefits so attractive that they assent to
contracts with the government.
In that event, what one hand of the government gives, the other
hand cannot and should not be able to take away via regulation, if that
regulation substantially excuses nonperformance by the government.
Centex fell into this latter category. While it is true that private parties
cannot hold Congress to its "promises" not to tax, they can do so
when those promises are memorialized in a contract and the
government specifically seeks to absolve itself of the duties that the
contract requires. Thus, the two quotes that open this Comment are
not the paradox they seem. While Congress's power to raise revenue
through tax is and should be broad, its breadth should not swallow the
duty to honor contracts that are just as vital to the nation's health. No
matter how full the treasury coffers become, they cannot hold enough
to pay the price for a government that cannot be trusted to contract
faithfully.
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